We study the problem of computing linear rank inequalities, and the related problem of computing lower bounds on the linear share complexity of access structures. We prove that if one knows a generating set for the cone of linear rank inequalities on n + 1 variables, then he can use this generating set and linear programming (or semi-infinite programming) to compute the exact linear optimal information ratio of any access structure on n parties. This theorem shows that it is useful and important to compute generating sets for the cones of linear rank inequalities on a given number of variables. Then, we study the only method we know to cope with the later task, the so called common information method. We investigate the completeness of this method and we prove some preliminary results suggesting that the method is not complete (i.e. there are linear rank inequalities which cannot be obtained via the studied method).
Introduction
We have become interested in the theory of linear polymatroids, and more specifically in the linear inequalities satisfied by those submodular functions, because we are interested in the study of lower bounds on the share complexity of linear secret sharing. Linear secret sharing is an important topic in cryptography and multiparty computation. It is known that one can use linear rank inequalities (which are the linear inequalities satisfied by linear polymatroids) to compute lower bounds on the linear optimal information ratio of different access structures [5] , [13] . Actually, it seems that it is the only way of obtaining nontrivial lower bounds for the optimal information ratio of general access structures. It is worth to remark that linear rank inequalities are important tools in the study of other communication problems, like for example, lower bounds on the linear capacity of information networks (see [8] ).
We prove in this paper that given an access structure of size n, if one knows a generating set of the linear rank inequalities on n+1 variables, then he can use either linear programming (if such a generating set is finite) or semi-infinite programming to compute the exact value of the optimal linear information ratio of the given access structure. Thus, some of the most important open problems in linear secret sharing could be solved if we understand the fine structure of the convex cones generated by linear polymatroids, the so called linear regions, together with the fine structure of their polar cones, which are constituted by the linear rank inequalities. Dougherty et al [7] have written a comprehensive monograph summarizing what is known about linear polymatroids and linear rank inequalities. It is known that for all n ≤ 5, the convex cone determined by the linear polymatroids of order n is a polyhedral cone [7] , and, for each n in this range, a finite set of the generating inequalities is already known. Dougherty [6] has used the common information method for searching linear rank inequalities on six variables and he reported on the discovering of more that one billion of independent inequalities. The common information method is an heuristic that can be used for the searching of new linear rank inequalities, and which can be turned into an automatic method. Actually, one of our contributions is an accurate description of such an algorithm. Dougherty et al [7] asked two questions which can be considered as the most important open problems in the theory of linear rank inequalities, they asked whether the linear regions are polyhedral and whether the common information method is a complete method that can be used to find all the linear rank inequalities. The last question is our motivating question, we conjecture that the common information method is not complete and we prove some preliminary results providing strong evidence in favor of our conjecture.
The relationship between linear rank inequalities and linear secret sharing is two way: if a set of linear rank inequalities yields inexact lower bounds for linear secret sharing, then it must be an incomplete set of inequalities. We use this observation, and some known facts concerning linear secret sharing and linear span programs [2] , [1] , [11] , to establish some facts suggesting that the com-mon information method is not complete. There are well known connections between linear secret sharing and linear span programs [11] , those connections imply that there exists a sequence of access structures whose asymptotic linear optimal information ratio is superpolynomial [2] . We prove, following Martin et al [13] , that the linear rank inequalities that can be obtained using the CI algorithm on a restricted class of inputs, does not yield superpolynomial lower bounds for linear secret sharing. It means, as mentioned before, that those inequalities cannot be a complete set of linear rank inequalities.
Organization of the work and contributions. This work is organized into seven sections including the introduction. In section two we introduce linear polymatroids and linear rank inequalities. In section three we survey the theory of linear secret sharing. In section four we establish some first relations between linear rank inequalities and linear secret sharing, we prove that if one knows a generating set for the cone of linear rank inequalities on n + 1 variables, then he can use this set and linear programming to compute the optimal linear information ratio of any access structure on n parties. In section five we study the common information method. In section six we prove some preliminary results suggesting that the common information method is not complete. We finish this paper in section seven with some concluding remarks.
Linear polymatroids
We introduce in this section the main definitions concerning the notion of linear polymatroids.
+ is a polymatroid of order n, if and only if:
Notice that one can think of a polymatroid of order n as it were an element of R 2 n −1 . To this end, he can fix a bijection from [2 n − 1] to ℘ ([n]) − ∅, and use the bijection to define a labeling of the canonical vectors of R 2 n −1 (using as labels the nonempty subsets of [n]). Suppose that, for n ≥ 1, we have already fixed such a labeling and suppose that h is a polymatroid of order n, then we can express h as h =
We will use the symbol Γ n to denote the set of all the polymatroids of order n. Notice that Γ n ⊆ R 2 n −1 is a closed convex cone, which is defined by a finite list of linear inequalities, that is: Γ n is a polyhedral cone. The polymatroidal inequalities defining Γ n are also called Shannon inequalities, [14] .
The notion of polymatroid is related to the mathematical notion of dimension. It becomes clear if we consider the different classes of polymatroids that one can find in the literature. A first example is the class of boolean polymatroids, which are related to the set-theoretical notion of cardinality. Let A = (A 1 , ..., A n ) be a tuple of finite sets, this tuple determines a boolean polymatroid of order n, which we denote with the symbol h A and which is defined by:
A second important example is the class of entropic polymatroids. Given a tuple of finite random variables X = (X 1 , ..., X n ), the tuple determines an entropic polymatroid of order n, which is denoted with the symbol h X , and which we define by:
where X I denotes the tuple (X i ) i∈I , and H (X I ) denotes its Shannon entropy (see, for example [4] ), which is, in some sense, the statistical dimension of the tuple X I .
A third important example is related to the notion of linear dimension, it is the class of linear polymatroids which we study in this paper.
Definition 2.2 (Linear polymatroid)
A linear polymatroid of order n is a polymatroid h : (℘ ([n]) − ∅) → R + , for which there does exist a tuple (V, V 1 , ..., V n ), where V is a finite vector space and V 1 , ..., V n are subspaces of V, and such that
Linear polymatroids are mentioned few times in the literature, but they are essentially the same as the well known linear rank functions. .., V n ), where V is a finite vector space and V 1 , ..., V n are subspaces of V , and for which it happens that:
Notation 2.4 From now on, and for the ease of notation, we write h (i) instead of h ({i}) , whenever h is a polymatroid and i is an element of its domain.
Proposition 2.5 For all linear polymatroid h there exists a linear rank function r and there exists c > 0 such that h = cr. On the other hand, for all linear rank function r there exist a linear polymatroid h and a constant d > 0 such that r = dh.
Proof. Let h be a linear polymatroid determined by a tuple (V, V 1 , ..., V n ) , where V is a vector space over a finite field F. Given I, a non empty subset of [n], we have that
and let r be equal to the linear rank function determined by the tuple R. Then we have that h = cr. The proof of the other claim is very similar. Definition 2.6 (Linear rank inequalities) A linear rank inequality of order n is a vector v ∈ R 2 n −1 such that for all linear polymatroid of order n, say h, it happens that the inequality h · v ≥ 0 holds. Remark 2.7 Given n, the set of all linear rank inequalities of order n is a convex cone.
Given A ⊆ R n , its polar is a closed convex cone. Notice that the closed convex cone of linear rank inequalities of order n is the polar of the set of linear polymatroids of order n. We use the symbol L Definition 2.9 Given h ∈ Γ n , we say that h is cc-linear if and only if h is the limit of a sequence of polymatroids, say {h n } n≥0 , such that for all n ≥ 0, the polymatroid h n is a positive linear combination of linear polymatroids.
We use the symbol L n to denote the closed convex cone constituted by all the cc-linear polymatroids of order n. This set will be called the linear region of order n.
Given A ⊆ R n , its conic closure is the smallest closed convex cone that contains the set A. The conic closure of A is constituted by all the vectors that can be expressed as the limit of a sequence whose terms are positive linear combinations of vectors in A. Thus, we have that the linear region of order n is the conic closure of the set of linear polymatroids of order n. Moreover, it can proved (see below) that the conic closure of A is equal to the set of vectors that satisfy all the linear inequalities contained in the polar of A.
Proof. Let h ∈ L n , there exists a sequence {h j } j≥1 such that h j → h and for all j, we have that h j is a positive linear combination of linear polymatroids.
, where for i = 1, ..., k j we have that c j i ∈ R + and f j i is a linear polymatroid, then
Thus, we have that h belongs to the polar of L
• n , and then L n is contained in the polar of L
On the other hand, we know that the subset of R 2 n −1 constituted by all the vectors that satisfy the linear inequalities contained in L • n , is equal to the conic closure of the set of linear polymatroids of order n. The later set is equal to L n , given that L n is the conic closure of those linear polymatroids. Then, we have that the polar of L
• n is contained in L n and then the proposition is proved.
Linear secret sharing
Suppose that you have a secret, and suppose that you want to break this secret into n shares in such a way that it can be reconstructed from those shares.
To make things become more interesting, we can suppose that there exists a predetermined family of large subsets of [n], the qualified subsets, such that the secret can be reconstructed from the shares belonging to any subset within the family. We will use the term access structure to denote the set of qualified sets.
Definition 3.1 (Access structure) An access structure is a pair (n, C), such that C is a filter over [n], i.e. C is a non empty family of subsets of [n] that is upward closed. Now, suppose that an access structure (n, C) has been fixed, and suppose that you want to privately communicate your shares to n parties. Suppose that there is an eavesdropper who wants to know your secret. If the eavesdropper has the possibility of infiltrating the small sets of parties (the unqualified sets that do not belong to the access structure (n, C)), then you must choose your shares in such a way that no information about the secret can be obtained from the shares that were communicated to small sets of parties. How can you choose (compute) the n shares of your secret? It is The Secret Sharing Problem see [5] and [13] .
Given n ≥ 1, and given an access structure (n, C), a solution to the secret sharing problem defined by this pair is called a secret sharing scheme, we are mainly interested in schemes whose underlying functions are linear maps (the so called linear secret sharing schemes). Definition 3.2 (Linear distribution scheme) Given n ≥ 1, a linear distribution scheme is a tuple Σ = (S × W, f 1 , ..., f n ), where S and W are vector spaces over the same finite field, and f 1 , ..., f n are linear mappings from S × W to S × W .
Scheme Σ is supposed to be used by a dealer, who wants to distribute shares of a secret s ∈ S to n parties. To this end, he must choose, uniformly at random, a vector w ∈ W and then compute f 1 (s, w) , ..., f n (s, w). Given i ≤ n, the value f i (s, w) is the share that the dealer privately communicates to party i. Does a linear distribution scheme provide a safe way of sharing your secret? Notice that a linear distribution scheme is not specifically designed to fulfill the requirements imposed in the definition of the secret sharing problem, as determined by the given access structure. Thus, it is necessary to elaborate a little bit more. Given a linear distribution scheme Σ = (S × W, f 1 , ..., f n ) , and given X Σ , a random variable uniformly distributed over S ×W , we can use the functions f 1 , ..., f n to define a tuple of random variables X , and it is defined in the following way
On the other hand, the random variable X n+1 Σ is distributed over S, and it is defined as follows
, we use the symbol X I Σ to denote the join random variable {X
Remark 3.3 (Linear random variables) Let (V, V 1 , ..., V n ) be a tuple such that V is a finite vector space and such that V 1 , ..., V n are subspaces of V . Let X be a random variable that is uniformly distributed over V and let (X 1 , ..., X n ) be the tuple of random variables that are induced by X over the quotients
. We say that the tuple (X 1 , ..., X n ) is a tuple of linear random variables, and any tuple of random variables having such a representation is also said to be a tuple of linear random variables.
Definition 3.4 (Linear secret sharing scheme) We say that a linear distribution scheme Σ is a linear secret sharing scheme realizing the access structure (n, C), if and only if, the following conditions are satisfied:
, for all J / ∈ C Remark 3.5 Given X and Y two random variables, the symbol H (X | Y ) denotes the conditional entropy of X given Y , which is equal to H (X, Y ) − H (Y ). Given h a polymatroid of order n and given R, J ⊆ [n], we set
One can identify a secret sharing scheme with the tuple of random variables it determines. Can a secret sharing scheme be reconstructed from the related tuple of random variables? We think that the answer is just a partial yes: if one knows a concrete representation of the tuple, one can use this representation to construct a secret sharing scheme related to this tuple. Nevertheless, some authors (see [5] ) use to define a secret sharing scheme as a tuple of random variables whose Shannon entropies satisfy the correctness-constraints and the privacy-constraints determined by the access structure under consideration.
Let n ≥ 1, let (n, C) be an access structure over [n] and let Σ be a linear secret sharing scheme, notice that Σ determines a linear polymatroid h Σ defined by for all
Moreover, we have that:
Given h ∈ Γ n+1 , if the polymatroid h satisfies the above conditions determined by C, then we say that h is compatible with the access structure C.
Ito et al [10] proved that for any access structure there exists a linear secret sharing scheme realizing it. Unfortunately, those schemes exhibit an unpleasant feature: the size of the shares is exponential with respect to the size of the secret. Given a secret sharing scheme, the ratio between the size of the shares and the size of the secret is a measure of the efficiency and applicability of the scheme. If the ratio is large, computing and communication times could become prohibitive. Moreover, if the ratio is large and the shares are huge, the security provided by the scheme can be corrupted for practical reasons: it could happens that the parties do not have enough internal memory to store such a huge shares, and then, they can become forced to store their shares using an unsafe external memory (as the cloud), which could be infiltrated by the eavesdropper. Definition 3.6 (Information ratio) Given an access structure (n, C) and given a secret sharing scheme Σ, the information ratio denoted by σ * (Σ) is equal to
Definition 3.7 (Optimal linear information ratio) Given an access structure (n, C), the optimal linear information ratio σ (C) is defined by
is a linear secret sharing scheme for (n, C)} Thus, if one has to cope with the secret sharing problem determined by an access structure (n, C), he must try to construct a linear secret sharing scheme whose information ratio approximates the optimal linear information ratio of (n, C). To this end, it would be useful to know, in advance, which is the exact value of this ratio. How can one compute the optimal linear information ratio of a given access structure? Using the right linear rank inequalities.
Computing optimal ratios
In this section we prove a series of technical results, which ensure that if one knows a generating set for the linear rank inequalities on n + 1 variables, 1 Given Σ, the information ratio σ (Σ) is defined as
. We have prefered to introduce our definition of σ * (Σ), which is very similar to the standard one, and which will allow us to simplify the proofs of our main results. then he can compute the exact optimal linear information ratio of any access structure on n parties.
If h ∈ Γ n+1 is an abstract polymatroid which is compatible with the access structure C, it could happens that h does not encode a secret sharing scheme for C. Then, if one computes
and h is compatible with C} he is not computing the optimal information ratio of C, he is computing a lower bound for this ratio. Moreover, the seminal results of Csirmaz [5] indicate that, for infinitely many access structures, the value β C is far away from the real ratio.
If h has a concrete representation by a tuple of vector subspaces of a given vector space (i.e. h is a linear polymatroid), the polymatroid h effectively encodes a linear secret sharing scheme for C (see below). Then, instead of computing β C , one must compute the minimum of F over the discrete (and infinite) set of linear polymatroids that are compatible with the given access structure. Thus, it makes sense to compute
and h is compatible with C} We have to take into account that L n+1 is not the set of linear polymatroids of order n + 1, the cone L n+1 is the conic closure of the former set, and it contains infinitely many polymatroids that are not linear polymatroids, and which are not related to any linear secret sharing scheme. Thus, it could happens that λ C is just a new (maybe tighter) lower bound for σ (C) . We prove, in this section, that it is not the case. We prove that for all access structure (n, C) , the equality σ (C) = λ C holds. Proof. Given h ∈ Γ n+1 , we have that F (h) is the slope of the two-dimensional ray determined by the point P h = (h (n + 1) , h ({1, ..., n})). Notice that P h belongs to the first quadrant of R 2 . Now, we make the proof by induction on m.
• Let m = 2. Given h 1 , h 2 ∈ Γ n+1 , and given c 1 , c 2 > 0, we have that F (c 1 h 1 + c 2 h 2 ) is equal to the slope of the ray determined by P c 1 h 1 +c 2 h 2 .
Notice that P c 1 h 1 +c 2 h 2 belongs to the cone determined by P h 1 and P h 2 . Thus, the slope of this ray is bigger than the minimum of the slopes of the rays determined by P h 1 and P h 2 , and it means that
• Now we suppose that the assertion holds for m = k, and we make the proof for m = k + 1. Given h 1 , h 2 , ..., h k+1 ∈ Γ n+1 , and given c 1 , c 2 , ..., c k+1 > 0, we set h = c 1 h 1 + c 2 h 2 + ... + c k h k and we set g = c k+1 h k+1 . We have that h, g ∈ Γ n+1 , given that Γ n+1 is closed under positive linear combinations. Notice that
On the other hand, if min {F (h) , F (g)} = F (h), we have that
and the lemma is proved.
Next theorem asserts that one can correctly compute linear secret sharing ratios, if one works on the right sections of the linear regions. Thus, in some sense, this theorem answers a question of Csirmaz, who asked the following: which is the right closure of the set of linear polymatroids? Is it either the set of all rays generated by linear polymatroids, or the convex closure of those rays? Notice that the later set behaves better than the former, which is not convex. Notice also that, according to our results, the later set allows one to compute exact lower bounds for secret sharing. Thus, both closures are equally correct, but the later (the set of cc-linear polymatroids) has the pleasant structure of a closed convex cone and can be effectively used in the applications. 
Proof. First at all we observe that F is constant on any ray, it means that
Notice that the later set is a compact one and hence
Thus there exists h ∈ ∆ ∩ L n+1 such that F (h) = α. Then, there must exist a sequence {g i } i≥0 ⊆ ∆ ∩ L n+1 , such that g i → h and for all i ≥ 0, the polymatroid g i is a positive linear combination of linear polymatroids. We have that lim i→∞ F (g i ) = α. Charatheodory's convexity theorem asserts that for all i ≥ 0, there exist h i 1 , h i 2 , ..., h i 2 n+1 linear polymatroids, and there exist
Notice that for all i ≥ 0 and for all
holds by lemma 4.2. Now, given i ≥ 0, we use the symbol h k(i) to denote the element of h i 1 , ..., h i 2 n+1 that minimizes the function F within this finite set. Then we have that
Thus, if for all i ≥ 0 we set h i = h k(i) the theorem is proved. Let (n, C) be an access structure, given I ∈ C, we use the symbol v I to denote the linear rank inequality e {n+1}∪I − e I and given J / ∈ C we use the symbol w J to denote the linear rank inequality
Finally, we use the symbol ∆ C to denote the set {v ∈ R 2 n +1 : v · v I = 0 for all I ∈ C, and
We get from theorem 4.3 the following two results.
we have that α C is the optimal linear information ratio of (n, C).
Proof. Given α C there exists a sequence {h i } i≥0 of linear polymatroids such that for all i ≥ 0, h i ∈ ∆ C and such that lim i→∞ F (h i ) = α C . Given j ≥ 0, the linear polymatroid h j is given by a tuple V j , V j 1 , ..., V j n+1 . Set:
• W j is a subspace of V j such that V j is isomorphic to S j × W j .
• For all i ≤ n, the linear mapping f j i is equal to the projection of V j into the subspace
, it is easy to check that Σ j is a linear secret sharing scheme for C. Moreover, the equality
Given σ (C), there exists a sequence {Σ i } i≥0 of linear secret sharing schemes realizing C and such that lim
We have that F h Σ j = σ * (Σ j ). Thus, we have that α C ≤ σ (C) and the theorem is proved.
Let Ψ = {Ψ n } n≥1 be a sequence such that for all n ≥ 1, we have that Ψ n is a subset of the cone of linear rank inequalities on n variables. Given an access structure (n, C), we set
Corollary 4.5 If there exists an access structure (n, C) such that σ
Proof. Notice that if σ Ψ (C) < σ (C) , then the convex cone determined by Ψ n+1 , which is equal to Ψ • n+1 , is strictly larger than the set L n+1 . Last corollary asserts that, if a certain set of linear rank inequalities does not allow one to compute the exact linear information ratio of some access structure, then he is using a wrong set of linear rank inequalities, he is using an incomplete set.
Searching inequalities
The results presented in the previous sections show, among other things, that it is important to know which are the linear inequalities satisfied by linear polymatroids. Given n ≥ 1, if we could compute a finite list of linear rank inequalities generating the cone L
• n , then we could use those inequalities for computing, using linear programming, the exact value of the optimal linear information ratio of any access structure with n − 1 parties. Thus, it would be great news if for all n ≥ 1, the cone L n were a polyhedral cone. Dougherty et al [7] asked if, for all n ≥ 1, the cone L n is polyhedral. It is known that L m , with 1 ≤ m ≤ 5, is polyhedral [7] , unfortunately we cannot say any more concerning this issue. Dougherty et al [7] have used the common information method for the searching of new linear rank inequalities. This method is based on the fact that linear random variables have common information (as defined below). It is the only method we know, and the only method that has been employed in the related literature, for the searching of linear rank inequalities. Dougherty et al [7] asked if the common information method is complete, that is: they asked if any linear rank inequality can be obtained using the method. We are studying this second question and we will prove, in next section, some preliminary results which can be regarded as evidence supporting our conjecture that the method is not complete.
Definition 5.1 Given random variables X 1 , ..., X n and given two sets I, J ⊆ [n], a common information for X I and X J is a random variable Y such that:
Let h be a linear polymatroid, let (V i ) i∈[n] be a tuple of vector subspaces representing h, and let (X i ) i≤n be the tuple of linear random variables determined by it. Given I, J ⊆ [n], the random variables X I and X J have a common information [7] . This fact is the basis of the method, which is a kind of projection method that has been used as a heuristic, but which can be completely automatized (see below).
Given n ≥ 1 and given J, K ⊆ [n], we define a set of linear rank inequalities, which we denote with the symbol ∆ 
a * I e I , where
Notice that T n+1 J,K is a linear map. Those maps are the projections employed in the common information method. Next theorem asserts that if one picks a linear rank inequality on n+1 variables within the set ∆ n+1 J,K , then he can apply T n+1 J,K to the chosen inequality to get a linear rank inequality on n variables. It is the mathematical core of the method.
• n , then there exists a tuple of linear random variables
.., X n , X n+1 ) where X n+1 is the common information of X I and X J . It is easy to check that the equality
Then, we have that v is not a linear rank inequality, which is clearly a contradiction.
Example 5.3 (Ingleton's inequality) Let α be equal to − e {1,2,3} + e {1,2,4} + e {3,4} + 2e 1 + 2e 2 + e 5 +e {1,3} + e {1,4} + e {2,3} + e {2,4} + 2e {1,5} + 2e {2,5}
It can be checked that α is a linear rank inequality (α is a Shannon inequality). Moreover, it can be checked that α ∈ ∆ 5 {1},{2} and that
{1},{2} (α) = − e 1 + e 2 + e {1,2,3} + e {1,2,4} + e {3,4} +e {1,3} + e {1,4} + e {2,3} + e {2,4} + e {1,2}
According to theorem 5.2, T 5 {1},{2} (α) is a linear rank inequality. Actually, it is the famous Ingleton's inequality [9] , which was the first ever discovered non-Shannon inequality that holds for all linear polymatroids.
One can use the method employed above, in the derivation of Ingleton's inequality, as a general method for the searching of new linear rank inequalities. It is the common information method, which we will proceed to define in the next few paragraphs. First some definitions Given n, k ≥ 1 and given J, K ⊆ [n + (k − 1)], we use the symbol Ω n+k J,K to denote the subspace of R 2 n+k −1 determined by the equations:
4. x · e {n+k} − e J − e K + e J∪K = 0
Definition 5.5 (Extremal rays) Given a closed convex cone ∆ ⊆ R n , and given v ∈ ∆, we say that v is an extremal ray of ∆, if and only if, v = 1 and for all u, w ∈ ∆ and for all α, β ∈ R, if the equality v = αu + βw holds, then u and w are scalar multiples of v.
A convex cone ∆ ⊆ R n is a polyhedral cone, if and only if, it has a finite number of extremal rays. Moreover, if ∆ is polyhedral it is completely determined by the finite set of its extremal rays: ∆ is the conic closure of its extremal rays.
Algorithm 5.6 (The CI Algorithm) We define the CI algorithm in the following way:
Input: (n, k, ∆), where n, k ≥ 1 and ∆ is a polyhedral cone included in L
• n+k , (we suppose that the cone ∆ is presented as the finite list of its extremal rays).
1. Set X = ∆. (X I,J ).
Compute
(X I,J ).
2.3
Compute W i , which is equal to the set of extremal rays of the convex cone determined by the finite set Z i .
Set
The above algorithm is a galactic one, which cannot be effectively used on most inputs, because of its prohibitive running time and work space requirements. Dougherty, Freiling and Zeger [7] used it on input (5, 2, Γ 7 ), obtaining in this way a set of linear rank inequalities that generate the cone L • 5 . Dougherty [6] used the same algorithm, on input (6, 2, Γ 8 ), and he reported on the discovering of more than one billion of new linear rank inequalities, which are pairwise independent and which do not constitute a generating set for L 
Dougherty et al [7] asked if the Common Information Method is complete, we would like to attack this question, and we think that a first important step is to clarify its scope. To this end, we can use the definitions introduced above.
QUESTION: Given n ≥ 1, does CI [n] generate the set L
• n ? We will not answer the above question in this work, but in next section we will prove a preliminary result claiming that there exists n ≥ 6 such that CI [n, 2] does not generate the cone L • n .
Preliminary results: CI [n, 2] is incomplete
Now, we use the tools that we have introduced in the previous sections in order to get some interesting results. As a warm up, we will prove a theorem of Kinser [12] , which claims that there are new linear rank inequalities at any dimension beyond four. Theorem 6.1 Given n ≥ 1, there exists N > n and there exists a linear rank inequality on N variables which cannot be derived from the linear rank inequalities on n variables.
Proof. Let g : N → N be the function defined by g (m) = max{σ (C) : (C, m) is an access structure} It follows from the works of Wigderson and Karchmer [11] , and Babai et al [1] , that g (m) ∈ Ω(m log m/ log log(m) ); i.e. g is a superpolynomial function. Given 1 ≤ m < k, we use the symbol (L m k )
• to denote the set of linear rank inequalities on k variables such that at most m variables actually occur. Consider the sequence Φ = {Φ k } k≥1 , defined by
• Given Φ, we define a function g Φ : N → N in the following way:
It follows from the work of Martin et al [13] that g Φ (m) ∈ O (m n−1 ). Thus, we have that g Φ is asymptotically dominated by g, and then there must exist N > n, such that g Φ (N ) < g (N ). Then, there exists an access structure C over [N ] , such that σ Φ (C) < σ (C) . It follows from corollary 4.5 that Φ N +1 ⊂ L
• N +1 , and the theorem is proved.
Csirmaz proved that Shannon inequalities do not yield superlinear lower bounds for secret sharing, it implies that Shannon inequalities cannot yield superlinear lower bounds for linear secret sharing. Notice that the output of the CI algorithm, on input (n, 0, Γ n ) , is a spanning set for the Shannon inequalities on n variables. Thus, according to Csirmaz, the outputs of CI, on this restricted class of inputs, cannot constitute a complete set of linear rank inequalities. Martin et al [13] used the method of Csirmaz to prove that if one runs the CI algorithm, on the infinite set of inputs {(n, 2, Γ n ) : n ≥ 1}, then the linear rank inequalities that can be obtained this way yield lower bounds for secret sharing which are at most polynomial. Therefore, we have Proof. In this case we consider the sequence Ψ = {Ψ k } k≥1 , where Ψ k is the set of linear rank inequalities on k variables that can be obtained as outputs of CI, on the input (k, 2, Γ k+2 ). Now we define g Ψ : N → N as g Ψ (m) = max{σ Ψ (C) : (C, m) is an access structure} It follows from the work of Martin et al [13] that g Ψ (m) ∈ O (m 4 ). Thus, we have that g Ψ < g, and that there exists N > n, such that g Ψ (N ) < g (N ). Then, there exists an access structure C, over [N ] , such that σ Ψ (C) < σ (C) . It follows, once again from corollary 4.5, that Ψ N +1 ⊂ L
Concluding remarks
We conjecture that the common information method is not complete. The first thing that we could try is to extend the results of Martin et al [13] , and prove that for all k ≥ 1, there must exist n such that CI [n, k] does not span the cone L • n . It seems that the method employed by those authors does not work for larger k's. And, on the other hand, if we were able to extend those results for all k > 2, we could not immediately conclude that, for all n ≥ 1, the set CI [n] does not generate the cone L • n . Moreover, if we could prove that the set CI [n] does not generate the cone L
• n , we could not immediately conclude that the common information method is not complete. It is the case, given that we are restricting the application of the CI algorithm to a very special class of inputs: we are only considering inputs such that the third component of all of them is constituted by Shannon inequalities. Notice that one can include in the inputs of our CI algorithm, some of the already known non-Shannon inequalities [14] , and it could happens that those non-Shannon inequalities were the key for obtaining the spanning sets of the cones of linear rank inequalities. Thus, we think that in order to prove our conjecture it would be necessary to try a more robust approach. Fortunately, there are some options to try, and we are already studying some promising approaches. One of those possible attacks is related to the work of Chan et al [3] regarding the relations between linear sharing and abelian sharing. Additional results related to those new attacks to our conjecture will appear soon, in the forthcoming Ph.D thesis of the author.
